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Abstract 
We offer a new account of the role of values in theory choice that captures a temporal dimension 
to the values themselves. We argue that non-epistemic values sometimes serve as “inquiry 
tickets,” justifying scientists’ pursuit of certain questions in the short run, while the answers to 
those questions mitigate transient underdetermination in the long run. Our account of inquiry 
tickets shows that the role of non-epistemic values need not be restricted to belief or acceptance 
in order to be relevant to hypothesis choice: the relevance of non-epistemic values to a particular 
cognitive attitude with respect to h vary over time.  
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 1. Introduction 
While the science-values relationship and the underdetermination of theory by evidence have 
been investigated independently, they also enjoy a history of symbiosis  (e.g., Anderson 2004, 
Longino 1990, Nelson 1993). Beginning with the Quine-Duhem thesis, questions of 
underdetermination have arisen in conjunction with a reexamination of the privileged ideal of 
value-free science. More recently, philosophical projects addressing science and values have 
increasingly focused on temporary or “transient” underdetermination, as clear instances where 
values play an epistemic role (Biddle 2013, Brown 2013, Elliott 2011, Intemann 2005).   
Interestingly, however, while transient underdetermination has clear temporal dimensions, 
the aforementioned scholarship on science and values has not accorded values similar temporal 
dimensions. In other words, while all agree that transient underdetermination behaves differently 
in the short- and long-term, values—whether epistemic or not—are generally assumed to play 
the same role over all timescales.  
In this paper, we explore non-epistemic values’ important temporal dimensions, by 
highlighting their role as “inquiry tickets.” In this capacity, they justify scientists’ pursuit of 
certain questions in the short run, and the answers to those questions mitigate transient 
underdetermination in the long run. Because inquiry tickets only involve pursuit in the short run, 
the role of non-epistemic values need not be restricted to belief or acceptance in order to be 
relevant to hypothesis choice: the relevance of non-epistemic values to a particular cognitive 
attitude with respect to h vary over time. In this way, we join others in highlighting the different 
relationships between non-epistemic values and various cognitive attitudes  (e.g., Elliott and 
Willmes 2013).  Section 2 presents our account of inquiry tickets. Section 3 then discusses its 
implications for debates about science and values. While inquiry tickets are compatible with the 
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ideal of value-free science, they replicate many science-values interactions thought incompatible 
with that ideal. 
2. What are Inquiry Tickets? 
Section 2.1 presents our account of inquiry tickets. Section 2.2 then illustrates how non-
epistemic values can function as inquiry tickets with an example from biology. 
 2.1 Framework 
As stated above, values function as inquiry tickets when they justify the pursuit of a question, 
where the answer to that question breaks an earlier tie between two competing hypotheses. More 
precisely, non-epistemic considerations’ role in mitigating transient underdetermination must be 
understood as spanning three distinct stages of inquiry: 
 
Transient Underdetermination: At time t0, all of the epistemic considerations available at 
t0 equally support competing hypotheses h and h*. Call the set of these considerations E0. 
 
Short Run: At time t1, pursuing a question Q is conducive to a set of goals G adopted by 
some scientist S, and Q is such that:  
 
(1) If the pursuit of Q were successful, then a currently unavailable epistemic 
consideration, e, would be made available, and  
(2) If e were true, it would, in conjunction with all of the members of E0, support h* 
over h. 
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Long Run: At time t2, the pursuit of Q succeeds. As a result, e is available, and h* is 
better supported by the conjunction of e and the members of E0 than h is. Hence, it is 
more rational to believe h* than it is to believe h. 
 
We shall call any member of G that plays this complex, intertemporal role an inquiry ticket. Our 
claim is that some inquiry tickets are non-epistemic (i.e. ethical, social, or political) values. To 
better motivate this thesis, we discuss each of these three stages in greater detail. 
 
 2.1.1 Transient Underdetermination (t0) 
The need for inquiry tickets arises in response to transient underdetermination. In general, in 
underdetermination, a given body of evidence fails to pick out a unique theory. This can be given 
weaker or stronger glosses. We have opted for a relatively modest gloss.  
Because many early defenders of non-epistemic values in science (Anderson 1995, 
Longino 1990, 2002, Nelson 1990, 1993) borrowed heavily from (Duhem 1954), (Quine 1951), 
and (Kuhn 1977), they inherited a much bolder underdetermination thesis, namely: 
 
Global Underdetermination Thesis: For any hypothesis h and any set of epistemic 
considerations e, there is some other hypothesis h* that is as well supported as h by e.1 
 
                                               
1 The literature is not unanimous in characterizing these particular theorists as proponents of 
global underdetermination. We think that the figures cited above are at least ambiguous on this 
front. However, the paper’s main argument does not hinge on these finer exegetical points. 
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As many have argued, it is unclear whether global underdetermination is actually a feature of 
scientific practice, or merely a philosophical contrivance (Kitcher 2001, Laudan 1990, Laudan 
and Leplin 1991, Norton 2008). In contrast, we only hold that some hypotheses are 
underdetermined, and only for a time, i.e., 
 
Transient Underdetermination Thesis (TUT): There exists some hypothesis h and some 
time t, such that there is some other hypothesis h* that is as well supported as h by all of 
the epistemic considerations available at t. 
 
A brief terminological clarification: in its traditional slogan form, evidence underdetermines 
theories. We have opted for the phrase “epistemic considerations,” to pinpoint the sticking point 
in debates about value-free science. Empirical evidence is one kind of epistemic consideration, 
but others include rules of reasoning that take evidence and background information as their 
inputs and probabilities of hypotheses as their outputs. Rules of reasoning include the canons of 
inductive and deductive inference, plus some prima facie plausible methodological maxims, e.g. 
“ceteris paribus, if h correctly predicts some novel phenomenon e, then P(h|e) > P(h).” Some of 
these rules and maxims presumably invoke traditional theoretical virtues or “epistemic values” 
such as simplicity, scope, fruitfulness, fit with background beliefs, etc. At any rate, for our 
purposes, we can rather indiscriminately refer to all of these as “epistemic considerations” 
without loss. 
 
2.1.2 Short Run (t1) 
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As noted above, transient underdetermination highlights evidence and hypotheses’ temporal 
dimensions, but non-epistemic values also require an analogous temporalization. We begin by 
examining the stage of inquiry after transient underdetermination but before its resolution—the 
“short run.”  
Scientists punch their inquiry tickets by adopting a future-oriented attitude in order to look 
beyond the transient underdetermination in the short run, so as to discover additional and 
decisive epistemic considerations in the long run. This future-oriented attitude is not belief; it is 
pursuit. We define pursuit as follows: 
A person S pursues a question Q if and only if some of S’s actions have the discovery of a 
correct answer to Q as their goal. 
While canonical discussions take theories to be the objects of pursuit (Laudan 1977, Whitt 
1990), more recent discussions have broadened this to include phenomena, correlations, and 
technologies, among other things (Seselja, Kosolosky, and Strasser 2012). We prefer to think of 
questions as the objects of all pursuits. Questions in turn can be about theories, phenomena, etc. 
Quite naturally, pursuits are successful just in case correct answers to the questions of interest are 
discovered. 
 In the context of transient underdetermination, non-epistemic considerations can justify 
certain kinds of pursuit that furnish tie-breaking epistemic considerations. To that end, we 
loosely follow Seselja, Kosolosky, and Strasser (2012) in defining rational pursuit as follows: 
It is rational for S to pursue a question Q if and only if pursuing Q is conducive to S’s set 
of goals G. 
Now, our definition of pursuit builds one goal into G automatically: if someone pursues a 
question, then the discovery of at least one correct answer to that question is one of her goals. 
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However, this seems broadly epistemic in its orientation. Non-epistemic goals can also be in G. 
We provide an example below. The main point is that if this is correct, then non-epistemic 
considerations can play a role in justifying the pursuit of a question. 
 However, our claim is not merely that non-epistemic values can partly justify the pursuit 
of some questions, but that they can justify the pursuit of some questions that, if correctly 
answered, can mitigate transient underdetermination. This has two defining features. First, a 
correct answer to the question will make previously unavailable epistemic considerations 
available.2 Second, these hitherto unavailable epistemic considerations will break up the gridlock 
characteristic of transient underdetermination. These two considerations are indices of how 
“promising” it is to pursue the question. Paradigmatically, an answer to this question promises 
new evidence that bears on the underdetermined hypotheses. However, owing to our broad 
notion of epistemic consideration, the question might also suggest new rules of reasoning or 
methods that have the same effect. 
2.1.3 Long Run (t2) 
Finally, if all goes well, in the third and final stage—the long run—this pursuit makes good on 
its promise, and scientists have good epistemic reasons to believe one hypothesis over another. 
Hence, only epistemic considerations figure as rational determinants of belief, even though non-
                                               
2 Importantly, these successful pursuits only make previously unknown epistemic considerations 
available; they do not magically transform non-epistemic considerations into epistemic ones. 
Whether or not something is an epistemic consideration is conceptually independent of whether 
it is discovered through successful pursuit. 
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epistemic considerations are sometimes instrumental in pursuing the questions that led to the 
discoveries of those determinants. 
To summarize, in the short run (t1), a set of goals (G) justifies pursuit of a question (Q), the 
answer to which promises to yield an epistemic consideration (e). If that pursuit is successful in 
the long run (t2), then the epistemic consideration provides reasons for believing one hypothesis 
(h*) over another (h). We call any member of G that plays this role an inquiry ticket. Thus, our 
claim is that some inquiry tickets are non-epistemic considerations. We shall now establish this 
claim with a case study from biology. 
2.2   Case Study in Biology 
Gould’s (1978) and Gould and Lewontin’s (1979) well-known critiques of Barash’s (1976) work 
on mountain bluebirds helpfully illustrates the way non-epistemic values can function as inquiry 
tickets. Barash observed two pairs of mountain bluebirds during nest construction and egg-laying 
and cataloged the birds’ response to the presence of a physical model of a male mountain 
bluebird, placed near the nest at three 10-day intervals.3 Barash reports that male bluebirds 
attacked both their female mates and the model male bird when the model was placed near the 
nest during construction and before eggs were laid, but did not show aggression toward female 
mates after eggs were laid. Barash offers an adaptive evolutionary explanation for this pattern in 
behavior: male bluebirds were concerned about being “cuckolded” by their female mates before 
eggs were laid, but not after. Let Barash's anti-cuckoldry explanation be our hypothesis h. As 
Lewontin and Gould point out, this hypothesis is underdetermined in the face of a competing 
                                               
3 Following Barash, we use the word “model” to denote a physical facsimile of a male bluebird. 
Distinguish this from other meanings of “model” used by philosophers of science. 
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explanation that is equally compatible with Barash’s observations; namely that the birds may not 
be demonstrating an “anti-cuckoldry” effect, but may have become accustomed to the presence 
of the model or may be behaving this way independently of their concern for the propagation of 
their genes. Call this competing hypothesis h*. If we take Barash’s observations as the set of 
available epistemic considerations E0, choosing between h and h* is underdetermined by E0 at 
time t0.  
Recall that values function as inquiry tickets in relation to a research question, where a 
correct answer will adjudicate between two competing hypotheses. In this case, the question Q of 
interest at time t0 is presumably something like Gould’s suggestion: do mountain bluebirds 
demonstrate the same behavior toward a model when their first exposure to the model is after 
eggs are laid?  
Gould asserts that non-epistemic political values motivate much of sociobiological inquiry 
like Barash’s work, which he summarizes as “a defense of existing social arrangements as part of 
our biology” (1978, 532). While this is certainly a non-epistemic value, note that any number of 
other epistemic and non-epistemic values could also have served as inquiry tickets to motivate 
pursuit of Q in this case. In a later paper, (Morton, Geitgey, and McGrath 1978, 968)  pursue 
exactly this question, and write that they “hoped to confirm that [Barash's] tentative conclusions 
represented a widespread evolutionary reality.” This suggests that values like the fit with 
background assumptions or anticipated fertility of their experiment lead them to pursue Q as a 
source of epistemic considerations that would alleviate the transient underdetermination between 
h and h*. In this case, at time t2, their pursuit of Q is successful: Morton et al. demonstrate that, 
in fact, male bluebirds' behavior toward the introduction of a model male bluebird did not 
depend on nesting stage (in fact, males in the larger study demonstrated no aggression toward the 
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model at any stage, but female bluebirds repeatedly destroyed it, much to the experimenters’ 
distress). This new evidence e, taken together with Barash’s original E0, better supported Gould’s 
hypothesis that the bluebirds’ behavior was independent of concerns about gene-propagation, 
favoring h* over Barash’s anti-cuckoldry hypothesis, h. 
3. Implications for Science and Values Debates 
Now that we have shown how non-epistemic values can function as inquiry tickets, we situate 
our approach within the broader literature on science and values. In comparison to other 
positions in this literature, our view is relatively measured in the role that it accords to non-
epistemic values. Even the staunchest “value-freedom fighters” grant that non-epistemic values 
partially determine which research questions are pursued. Furthermore, our claim is not that 
every pursuit in response to every case of transient underdetermination is value-laden. Finally, 
non-epistemic considerations function as inquiry tickets only when adjoined to an epistemic 
goal—namely to correctly answer a scientific question that will alleviate transient 
underdetermination through epistemic considerations. 
Most strikingly, our view is consistent with (but does not entail) epistemic considerations 
being the only rational determinants for accepting or rejecting hypotheses. This is the core claim 
of the much-maligned “value-free ideal.”  Indeed, it is frequently identified with the value-free 
ideal (Douglas 2016, Elliott 2017). Following others, we will call this particular aspect of the 
value-free ideal “impartiality” (Anderson 2004, Lacey 1999). Since inquiry tickets concern 
pursuit, but not acceptance, impartiality is undisturbed.4 
                                               
4 Section 2’s characterization of the long-run framed inquiry tickets in terms of belief. Unlike 
belief, acceptance is (less controversially thought to be) voluntary, can be rational even when its 
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Are we being too tame in aligning ourselves with impartiality? This question suggests two 
possible answers. First, inquiry tickets may be only one part of a larger story about values in 
science. Hence, although inquiry tickets are compatible with impartiality, other parts of that story 
may not be. Alternatively, inquiry tickets’ compatibility with impartiality may be a feature rather 
than a bug. After all, we seem to get the best of both worlds: we give values an interesting role in 
scientific inquiry and we preserve a central role for epistemic considerations with little fanfare. 
We explore the latter route, as it seems the more controversial one in the science and values 
literature. Hence, in what follows, we defend a conditional claim: if you are a value-freedom 
fighter, then you can recoup much of what your critics claim as both proprietary and beneficial 
regarding transient underdetermination. In particular, Section 3.1 defends this conditional when 
the benefit in question involves resolution of the problem that Elliott (2011), (ChoGlueck 2018), 
and others call the “gap argument.” Section 3.2 defends this conditional when the benefit 
involves the role of inductive risk in scientific inquiry.5 
3.1 The Gap Problem 
                                               
content is known to be false, and is sensitive to context-specific purposes (Cohen 1992). For 
these reasons, acceptance is far likelier to be “partial,” i.e. rationally influenced by non-epistemic 
considerations. Thus, our arguments that acceptance is impartial suggest, a fortiori, that belief is 
also impartial. 
5 Our view has some affinities with Elliott and McKaughan’s (2009) approach, though unlike us, 
they do not aim to replicate the strengths of positions opposed to the value-free ideal. 
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The value-free ideal is sometimes abandoned so that non-epistemic considerations can settle 
underdetermination problems without forfeiting scientific rationality. Consider the following 
inconsistent set: 
G1. If non-epistemic considerations can be tiebreakers in cases of transient   
 underdetermination, then scientists may appeal to non-epistemic considerations  
 when accepting or rejecting hypotheses. 
G2.  Non-epistemic considerations can be tiebreakers in cases of transient   
 underdetermination. 
G3. Impartiality: Scientists should only appeal to epistemic considerations when  
 accepting or rejecting hypotheses. 
Call the task of rendering this set consistent the Gap Problem. Critics of the value-free ideal 
frequently accept G1 and G2, and hence deny impartiality (G3). By contrast, since value-
freedom fighters accept impartiality (G3), they take non-epistemic considerations to be ill-suited 
as rational determinants of acceptance and thereby deny G2 (Haack 1996). As is so often the 
case, one philosopher’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. 
The inquiry ticket account splits the difference by recasting G1 in terms of pursuit: 
G1*.  If non-epistemic considerations can be tiebreakers in cases of transient 
underdetermination, then scientists may appeal to non-epistemic considerations 
when pursuing certain questions. 
Clearly, pursuing a question about a theory does not entail accepting that theory. Indeed, one 
may pursue such a question with some expectation that the answer will disconfirm the theory. 
Similarly, accepting a theory does not entail that one pursues a question about that theory, as 
one’s curiosity may lie elsewhere. Hence, if non-epistemic values are reasons for pursuit, they 
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need not be reasons for acceptance. To put this another way, non-epistemic considerations only 
play a central role in the short run, where pursuit is at issue. Non-epistemic values do not play 
the same role in the long run, when rational acceptance of theories and hypotheses takes center 
stage. Thus, even if one is partial to impartiality, inquiry tickets are effective in recouping some 
role for non-epistemic values in closing the gap. 
3.2 The Problem of Inductive Risk 
Owing to Douglas’ (2000, 2009) resuscitation and reinvigoration of (Rudner 1953), inductive 
risk has become the dominant tool for critics of the value-free ideal. Paradigmatically, inductive 
risk theorists hold that the benefits of being right and costs of being wrong about a hypothesis 
determines when there is enough evidence to accept it. Thus, in a certain sense, inductive risk 
theorists take non-epistemic considerations to determine what counts as sufficient evidence—in 
our parlance, what counts as an adequate set of epistemic considerations (Biddle 2013, Douglas 
2000, Wilholt 2009).  
(Biddle 2013) connects the inductive risk framework to transient underdetermination. If 
inductive risk approaches are correct, then the very idea of basing one’s acceptance of a 
hypothesis on “enough” evidence (epistemic considerations) is already informed by non-
epistemic considerations (e.g. the expected value of that assessment). Hence, there is no way to 
be impartial (in the sense described above) without already undertaking value commitments. 
Thus, suspending judgment in the face of transient underdetermination may be epistemically 
irrational if the expected costs of being wrong about the hypothesis greatly outweigh the 
expected benefits of being right. For instance, agnosticism about a drug’s effectiveness may not 
be a rational response to the evidence if the drug’s benefits are modest and its side-effects are 
lethal. 
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As with wishful thinking, we can see inductive risk theorists and proponents of 
impartiality as resolving the following inconsistent set in competing ways: 
IR1. Accepting or rejecting a hypothesis at a given time depends upon whether the 
epistemic considerations are sufficiently strong. 
IR2. Whether the epistemic considerations are sufficiently strong is ‘‘a function of the 
importance, in a typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in accepting or 
rejecting the hypothesis’’ (Rudner, 1953, p. 2, emphasis in original). 
IR3. If accepting or rejecting a hypothesis at a given time depends upon the ethical 
importance of being mistaken in doing so, then scientists should appeal to non-
epistemic considerations when accepting or rejecting hypotheses. 
IR4.  Impartiality: Scientists should only appeal to epistemic considerations when 
accepting or rejecting hypotheses.6  
Inductive risk theorists will accept IR1-IR3, but reject IR4. Traditional value-freedom fighters 
maintain IR1, IR3, and IR4, but reject IR2. Typically, they claim that insofar as IR2 is true, it 
pertains only to the acceptance characteristic of public policy; IR2 does not pertain to the 
acceptance characteristic of scientific research (Mitchell 2004).  
As with wishful thinking, we defend the conditional claim that if one accepts impartiality, 
then inquiry tickets recoup many of the attractions of the inductive risk approach.  Like 
traditional value-freedom fighters, we can reject IR2. However, we side with inductive risk 
                                               
6 This is loosely patterned on (Biddle 2013, 126), who reconstructs and endorses Rudner’s 
argument, though we have recast it so as to make its challenge to impartiality more explicit. 
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theorists in holding that something similar to it applies to scientific research. We deal with this 
by recasting IR2 in terms of pursuit: 
IR2*. Whether the epistemic considerations are sufficiently strong is a function of the 
importance, in a typically ethical sense, of being misguided in one’s pursuits. 
Pursuits can be ethically misguided in two ways. First, one may fail to pursue a question one 
ought to pursue given the ethical risks involved (roughly: a failure of due diligence). Second, one 
may pursue a question one ought not to pursue because allocating resources to this pursuit has 
ethically harmful opportunity costs or pernicious social effects.7 
 On the picture being sketched here, inductive risk’s non-epistemic dimensions may affect 
pursuit (IR2*), without (directly) affecting acceptance (IR4). The resulting picture is plausible. 
When people take excessive risks, it is commonplace to wonder what questions they have asked 
themselves. Typically, these questions will be of the form “What would happen if I did X?” We 
then expect them to search out the answers to these questions if doing X has important ethical 
consequences. In other words, we expect them to pursue these questions. Science is no 
exception. For instance, in testing a drug’s effectiveness, it would be reasonable to demand that 
biomedical researchers pursued questions about harmful side effects. Furthermore, pursuit need 
not bear on acceptance, as already noted in Section 3.1. In other words, it appears possible for 
                                               
7 The idea of misguided pursuits neutralizes a potential counterexample, in which ideologically 
skewed scientific communities’ pursuits only yield epistemic considerations favoring one 
hypothesis. Such scientists may be misguided in failing to pursue different questions motivated 
by alternative values. However, they need not be irrational in accepting the hypothesis favored 
by the available epistemic considerations, as impartiality requires. 
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scientists to be rational in relying solely on epistemic considerations to set relevant evidential 
thresholds in accepting that a drug has a certain effect, while having ethical obligations to pursue 
further questions about its side-effects’ harmfulness before communicating these results to the 
broader public. This seems to replicate much of what inductive risk theorists seek, yet it is 
compatible with impartiality as a scientific ideal.  
Of course, our account holds that scientists should update their acceptance once the 
questions that they have pursued are answered. Again, this underscores the importance of the 
temporal dimension of values. Since the available epistemic considerations differ from the short 
run to the long run, one’s acceptance should also change at these different stages in inquiry.  
4. Conclusion 
We have introduced the concept of inquiry tickets, and argued that they are a useful way of 
framing how scientists overcome transient underdetermination. Using an example from biology, 
we argued that some non-epistemic considerations are inquiry tickets. Finally, we have shown 
that if one is sympathetic to the ideal of value-free science, then inquiry tickets are a useful way 
to recognize some of the same insights as those who reject this ideal.  
 We are optimistic that inquiry tickets provide a novel and fruitful way of developing the 
science and values literature in general, and of defending impartiality in particular. For instance, 
not all issues about science and values are tethered to underdetermination. Consequently, these 
issues may point to other philosophical benefits that conflict with the value-free ideal. To engage 
these challenges in the future, we note that our account can be generalized beyond cases of 
transient underdetermination. We would simply take the framework in Section 2.1 and omit its 
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first stage, where transient underdetermination occurs, while slightly revising the last two stages 
to reflect this change:  
 
Short Run: At time t1, the set of available epistemic considerations is E0, and pursuing a 
question Q is conducive to a set of goals G adopted by some scientist S. 
 
Long Run: At time t2, the pursuit of Q succeeds. As a result, e is available, and h is better 
supported by the conjunction of e and the members of E0 than it was at t1. Hence, it is 
more rational to believe h at t2 than it was to believe h at t1.  
 
In future work, we hope to ascertain whether this more general approach to inquiry tickets can 
replicate further benefits that critics of the value-free ideal claim as their own.  
Additionally, there are further challenges to the value-free ideal. These include the 
“descriptive challenge” that the value-free ideal is not faithful to many instances of good 
scientific practice, and the “boundary challenge” that epistemic considerations cannot be neatly 
separated from non-epistemic considerations (Douglas 2016).8 While space prohibits addressing 
those challenges here, we speculate that further and more detailed case studies might address the 
descriptive challenge, and that the distinctions between the short and the long run, and among 
pursuit and other cognitive attitudes (e.g. acceptance), form the basis of a defensible boundary 
between the non-epistemic and the epistemic. 
                                               
8 Section 3.2 suggests an answer to Douglas’ third and final, “normative” challenge to the value-
free ideal. 
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